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Undoubtedly, there are many situations where allegedly
defamatory communication is not made in a loose, figurative or
hyperbolic way, but the surrounding circumstances of the
communication would dictate to the average person that such
communication is only an opinion and should not be taken as an
assertion of fact. The Immuno court did not stop at the
application of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., but went ahead
and stated that the federal court's policy of "[i]solating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they
were uttered, indeed may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context." 227
In sum, in our system of federalism, the Federal Constitution
provides the minimum of free speech protection. Since the
federal courts will look to classify the communication by type
rather than on the circumstances and context surrounding the
communication, more allegedly slanderous and libelous
statements will not be constitutionally protected under the Federal
Constitution. Therefore, the New York State Constitution goes
further than the Federal Constitution in protecting free speech.
The New York courts will look at allegedly defamatory material
from the reasonable person standard based on the
communication's surrounding circumstances.
Guarneri v. Korea News, Inc. 2 2 8
(decided April 17, 1995)
Attorney Stephen Guarneri brought a libel action against the
newspapers Korea News, Inc. and Korea Central Daily News,
Inc., based on statements printed in their respective newspapers
about Mr. Guarneri's conduct as an attorney in a criminal
case. 22 9 The defendants separately appealed from an order
227. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
917.
228. 625 N.Y.S.2d 291 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
229. Id. at 292.
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denying their separate motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint
for failure to state a cause of action or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. 230 The grounds for the motion were based
on the defendants' theory that since the three articles in question
were expressions of pure opinion, they were protected forms of
free speech under both the New York State and Federal
Constitutions. 231
The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the
denial of the defendants' motions to dismiss constituted reversible
error. 232 Upon review of the statements in the three newspaper
articles, the court was convinced that the statements were not
reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning, but rather they
constituted pure opinion and thus, were constitutionally
protected. 2 33 In addition, the court ruled that, contrary to
plaintiff's contention, the opinions in the articles were adequately
supported by the statement of the underlying facts, and did not
imply that they were based on undisclosed facts. 2 34 Finally, the
court held that the articles were substantially true and since truth
is an absolute bar to a libel action, the defendants' motions to
dismiss should have been granted. 2 35
Mr. Guarneri, an attorney, brought suit against Korea News,
Inc. and Korea News Daily, Inc. after both newspapers printed
articles stating that Mr. Guarneri was dismissed from a criminal
230. Id.

231. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states that:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. Article I, § 8 of the New York
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects ... and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech or of the press. In all ... indictments for libels, the truth may

be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives

and for justifiable ends, the party shall be [found not liable]."
Id.

232. Guarneri,625 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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appeal case because he was unprepared and negligent in handling
the appeal. 2 36 The articles alleged that his conduct resulted in a
lost opportunity to appeal despite having been granted two
extensions. 2 37 In addition, the articles disclosed that the attorneys
appointed to replace Mr. Guarneri planned to pursue the
8
appeal. 23
Mr. Guarneri contended that he suffered damages resulting
from the statements published by the defendants. 239 The
defendants contended that the statements were not defamatory
because they constituted pure opinion.240 According to the court,
"a pure opinion is a statement of opinion which is accompanied
by recitation of the facts upon which it is based or does not imply
that it is based upon undisclosed facts." 24 1 The court reviewed
the statements and concluded that they were not reasonably
susceptible to a defamatory meaning. 242 Furthermore, the court
held that the statements actually "constituted pure opinion and
thus were constitutionally protected."243
In reaching its decision, the Guarneri court relied on
Steinhilber v. Alphonse244 and Inununo A. G. v. MoorJankowski.245 In Steinhilber, the New York Court of Appeals
stated that "expressions of an opinion false or not, libelous or
not, are constitutionally protected and may not be the subject of
private damage actions." 246 The court continued, stating that
"[w]hen ... the statement of opinion implies that it is based
upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those
reading or hearing it, it is a 'mixed opinion' and is
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.

239. Id.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
68 N.Y.2d 283, 501 N.E.2d 550, 508 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1986).

245. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, cert. denied,
500 U.S. 954 (1991).
246. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 286, 501 N.E.2d at 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
902 (citations omitted).
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actionable." 247 The Steinhilber court explained that "[t]he
actionable element of a 'mixed opinion' is not the false opinion
itself- it is the implication that the speaker knows certain facts,
unknown to his audience, which support his opinion and are
24 8
detrimental to the person about whom he is speaking."
In Steinhilber, the plaintiff was a member of the defendant's
union, Communication Workers of America, Local 1120, and
was employed at New York Telephone Company in Saugerties,
New York. 24 9 On August 7, 1983, the plaintiff crossed a union
strike line in violation of a union strike order and continued to
work until August 11, 1983, the day she resigned. 250 The union
subsequently issued a fine to plaintiff for working during the
strike and the membership authorized officers of the union to take
necessary steps to collect the fine. 25 1 The communication that
gave rise to the cause of action in Steinhilber was a tape recorded
message made by the union vice president of the local union
office, which automatically played when anyone dialed the
private union phone number. 252 The tape recorded message
commented about the plaintiff's weight, looks, character and
included other derogatory remarks designed to embarrass and
hurt the plaintiff. 253
The court addressed the issue of whether the statements were
pure opinion and thus privileged. 254 The Steinhilber court stated
that "if the statements are held to be expressions of opinion, they
are entitled to the absolute protection of the First Amendment [of
the Federal Constitution] by virtue of the Supreme Court's
categorical statement that: 'Under the First Amendment there is
no such thing as a false idea.' 255 Thus, the court concluded that
247. Id. at 289, 501 N.E.2d at 552-53, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
248. Id. at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 904.
249. Id. at 286-87, 501 N.E.2d at 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
250. Id. at 287, 501 N.E.2d at 551, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 902.

251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 289, 501 N.E.2d at 552, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 903.

255. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/30

4

et al.: Freedom of Speech and Press

1996]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS

although pure opinion statements are not actionable, mixed
25 6
opinion statements are.
Determining whether a given statement is fact or opinion is a
complex question of law for the court to decide. 25 7 The test
applied by the Steinhilber court was "whether the words
complained of, considered in the context of the entire
communication and of the circumstances in which they were
spoken or written, may be reasonably understood as implying the
assertion of undisclosed facts justifying the opinion." 25 8
The Steinhilber court also relied on a test set out in the
plurality opinion of Olman v. Evans.259 The test sets out four
factors for a court to consider in order to differentiate between
fact and opinion. Those factors are:
(1) an assessment of whether the specific language in issue has a
precise meaning which is readily understood or whether it is
indefinite and ambiguous; (2) a determination of whether the
statement is capable of being objectively characterized as true or
false; (3) an examination of the full context of the communication
in which the statement appears; and (4) a consideration of the
broader social context or setting surrounding the communication
including the existence of any applicable customs or conventions
which might 'signal to readers or listeners that what is being read
or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.' 260
The plaintiff, in Steinhilber, specifically pointed out that the
statement that she lacked "talent, ambition, and initiative"
implied that the speaker had an undisclosed basis for such
statement when examining "the whole communication as well as
256. Id.
257. Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381, 366
N.E.2d 1299, 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 950, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977).
258. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 290, 501 N.E.2d at 553, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
904.
259. Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).

260. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 292, 501 N.E.2d at 554, 508 N.Y.S.2d at
905 (citing Oilman, 750 F.2d at 983). For an extensive discussion of the four
factors, see Oilman, 750 F.2d at 978-84.
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its tone and its apparent purpose." 2 6 1 The Steinhilber court
concluded that due to the circumstances 262 surrounding the
statement the recorded message would be taken not literally, but
figuratively. 263 Subsequently, the court held that "[a]n analysis
of the statement that plaintiff lacks 'talent, ambition, and
initiative' in the light of the third and fourth Oilman factors (the
full verbal context of the statement and its broader social context)
thus compels the conclusion that the statement would be taken as
pure opinion. "264
However, the court stated that in another context "a flat
statement that a person lacks talent or ambition or initiative might
be viewed as a factual assertion, if considered under the first and
second Olman factors .... "265 Further, the court noted that
"even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of
statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made in
public debate, heated labor dispute, or other circumstances in
which an 'audience may anticipate [the use] of epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole.'" 266 Notwithstanding these findings, the
court, in Guarneri, adopted the rules set forth in Steinhilber, and
concluded that pure opinion statements are constitutionally
protected. 2 67
261. Steinhilber, 68 N.Y.2d at 293, 501 N.E.2d at 554-55, 508 N.Y.S.2d
at 906.
262. Steinhilber involved a labor dispute where the plaintiff and other
"strike crossers" were considered "traitors" since they failed to obey a union
strike order. Id. at 294, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 906. According
to the court, "it [was] not surprising that union officials would speak of
plaintiff to the membership in highly unflattering terms." Id. As observed by
the United States Supreme Court, "such exaggerated rhetoric [as applying the
word 'traitor' to an employee who crossed the picket line] [is a] commonplace
in labor disputes." Id. (citing Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286
(1974)).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 294, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 906-07.
265. Id. at 294, 501 N.E.2d at 555, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
266. Id. (citing Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp.,
611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)).
267. Guarneri v. Korea News, Inc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1995).
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The defendants sought support in Immuno A. G. v. MoorJankowski,268 a case the Guarnericourt also followed in reaching

its conclusion. The Immuno case assisted the Guarneri court in
analyzing the scope of free speech protection under the New
York State Constitution versus the Federal Constitution. The
Immuno court stated "the Supreme Court under the Federal
Constitution fix[es] only the minimum standards applicable
throughout the Nation, and the State courts supplement l those
standards to meet local needs and expectations." 269 The Immuno
court, in describing a broader role for free speech under the state
constitution, stated that "tradition is embodied in the free speech
guarantee of the New York State Constitution, beginning with the
ringing declaration that '[e]very citizen may freely speak, write
and publish... sentiments on all subjects.'" 270 Furthermore, the
Immuno court indicated that regardless of the method utilized by
the courts in applying the relevant factors, be it "interpretive,"
using a textual and historic analysis, or "noninterpretive,"
employing a traditional policy approach, the "protection afforded
by ... the New York Constitution is often broader than the

minimum required by" the Federal Constitution, particularly with
respect to the freedom of press and freedom of speech. 27 1 The
court continued on to explain that it "look[s] to our state law
because of the nature of the issue in controversy - liberty of the
press - where [New York] has its own exceptional history and
rich tradition." 272 New York's common law reveals the well settled standard that requires the published article at the center of
a defamation action to be read "in context to test the effect on the
268. 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991).
269. Id. at 248, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
270. Id. The court determined that the wording of article one, section eight
of the New York State Constitution signified that the citizens of New York
State, in not strictly following the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution, "set forth our basic democratic ideal of liberty of the
press. . .

."

Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 913.

271. Id. at 249, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914 (citing O'Neill
v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 523 N.E.2d 277, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1

(1988)).
272. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at
914.
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average reader [and] not to isolate particular phrases but to
273
consider the publication as a whole."
The Guarnericourt also adopted the rationale of the New York
274
Court of Appeals in Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc.
to reverse the Second Department. In libel actions, the general
rule is that truth is an absolute bar to the action. 2 75 Under the
common law theory, "the libelous statement was presumed to be
false and the defendant carried the burden of pleading and
proving, in defense, that the statement was true."' 276 Today,
however, "the burden is now on the libel plaintiff to establish the
falsity of the libel." 277 In Guarneri, this burden had not been
met. 2 78 In Rinaldi, the plaintiff was a New York Supreme Court
judge and the defendant a controversial investigative
journalist. 279 The defendant published stories describing the
judge as "incompetent, and probably corrupt."280 The defendant
based the stories on an investigation he conducted concerning the
sentencing practices of the judge. 28 1 Based on his investigation,
he determined that the judge was "suspiciously lenient" on
defendants involved in organized crime, and noticed a pattern
whereby inconsistent sentences were apparently being handed
down. 282 During the time in which the defendant conducted his
investigation, the plaintiff was indicted on two counts of perjury
283
by the Extraordinary Special Grand Jury of Kings County.
The defendant maintained that at the time of publication the
accusations were true and thus, a complete bar to a libel
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977).
275. Guarneri v. Korea News, Inc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1995).

276. Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 366 N.E.2d at 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d at
950.
277. Id. (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490
(1975)).

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Guarneri, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
Rinaldi, 42 N.Y.2d at 373, 366 N.E.2d at 1301, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
Id. at 376-77, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
Id. at 376, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
Id. at 377, 366 N.E.2d at 1303, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
Id. at 374, 366 N.E.2d at 1302, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
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action. 284 The court found, however, minor inaccuracies upon
which the plaintiff had no support, and thus, placed the truth of
the statements in dispute.2 85 The court concluded that a cause of
action for libel per se existed because
[a]ny written or printed article is libelous or actionable without
alleging special damages if it tends to expose the plaintiff to
public contempt, ridicule, aversion, or disgrace, or induce an
evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to
286
deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.

Despite this finding, the court went on to explain that even
though the statements may have been defamatory, in this instance
the plaintiff was a public official and was subject to a malice
standard. 2 87 Further, the Rinaldi court recognized that "the
burden is now on the libel plaintiff to establish the falsity of the

libel."288
284. Id. at 378, 366 N.E.2d at 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 379, 366 N.E.2d at 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
287. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). In
New York Times, the Supreme Court took note of the "profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270. The Rinaldi court indicated that "the Court
ruled that the First Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless the
official proves that the statement was made with actual malice i. e., with
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." Rinakli, 42 N.Y.2d at 379, 366 N.E.2d at 1305, 397
N.Y.S.2d at 949 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S at 279-80). The Rinaldi
court further noted that, under New York Times, "[t]he constitutional standard
requires that the plaintiff establish the existence of actual malice by proof of
'convincing clarity.'" Id. (citing New York Times, 376 U.S at 285-86). The
malice standard requires that the statement be made with "knowledge that [it]
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. (citing
New York Times, 376 U.S at 285-86).
288. Id. at 380, 366 N.E.2d at 1305, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950. According to
the court, the requirement to establish falsity "naturally follows from the actual
malice standard. Before knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth can be
established, the plaintiff must establish that the statement was, in fact, false."
Id. In addition to falsity, "[tlhe nature of the statement is [also] critical." Id.
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The Guarneri court, citing to Rinaldi, stated that truth is an
absolute bar to a libel cause of action. 2 89 The court found that
"the newspaper articles were substantially true as to the basic
facts" and "since truth is an absolute bar to a libel action, the
defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the
complaint should have been granted." ' 290 Thus, the Guarneri
court concluded that the New York State Constitution affords
greater protection than that of the Federal Constitution and ruled
that the statements made by the defendants were constitutionally
91
protected. 2
The decision in Guarnerihelped stress the differences between
New York and federal free speech protections. It is evident that
the New York State Constitution affords greater protection than
the Federal Constitution with respect to expressions of pure
opinion. 292 Under the New York State constitutional analysis, a
The court also stated that no matter how "pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact." Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
339-40 (1964)).
289. Guarneri v. Korea News, Inc., 625 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (App. Div. 2d
Dep't 1995).
290. Id.
291. Id. The court relied on the more expansive language of the New York
State Constitution, particularly the clause stating that "[e]very citizen may
freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press." Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8). With
regard to the expansive free speech rights in New York, the Immuno court
noted the following:
[T]he recognition in very early New York history of a constitutionally
guaranteed liberty of the press ... and the consistent tradition in this
State of providing the broadest possible protection to 'the sensitive role
of gathering and disseminating news of public events'

. . .

all call for

particular vigilance by the courts of this State in safeguarding the free
press against undue interference.
Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1277, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 913-14 (1991) (quoting O'Neill v. Oakgrove
Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 528-29, 523 N.E.2d 277, 282, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1,
4-5 (1988)).
292. Guarneri, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
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court will first look to "the content of the whole communication,

its tone and apparent purpose."293 Therefore, the New York
standard is whether a reasonable person would view statements as
expressing or implying factual assertions. 2 94 On the other hand,
under federal constitutional analysis, a court will begin its inquiry
by using a narrower approach to construe the type of speech. 295
Under the federal approach, "[tlhe fine parsing of its length and
breadth that [is] required.., for speech that is not loose,
figurative or hyperbolic" reflects this narrower approach. 296 In
distinguishing federal constitutional analysis from state
constitutional analysis, the Immuno court stated that "[i]solating
challenged speech and first extracting its express and implied
factual statements, without knowing the full context in which they
were uttered, indeed may result in identifying many more implied
factual assertions than would a reasonable person encountering
that expression in context. "297
Further, article I, section 8 of the New York State Constitution
specifically provides that if alleged libelous statements are found
to be true, then "the party shall be [found not liable]" 2 98 for
defamation. The Federal Constitution has no such provision. In
fact, the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution makes no
express reference to libelous statements at all. 299 The First
Amendment applies specifically to Congress and stresses the
restraint on their power to "abridge the freedom of speech, [and]
the press." 300 Unlike the Federal Constitution, article I, section 8
of the New York State Constitution provides additional free
speech protection, stating in affirmative terms, the right to
"'freely speak, write andpublish' and prohibits the use of official

293. Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at

914.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 254, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
Id. at 250, 567 N.E.2d at 1278, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
Id. at 255, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
Id.

298. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.

299. See supra note 231.
300. Id.
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authority which acts to 'restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press.'

30 1

302
Town of Huntington v. Pierce Arrow Realty Corp.

(decided June 5, 1995)

Plaintiff, Town of Huntington, sought a preliminary injunction
enjoining the defendants from continuing the operation of an

"adult entertainment cabaret" 3 0 3 within defendants' restaurant
and bar establishment. 3 0 4 Plaintiff alleged that the defendants

were in violation of a town zoning ordinance designed to restrict
'3 0 5 to
the location of premises which contain an "adult use"

designated areas within the Town of Huntington. 306 The Supreme
Court, Suffolk County, granted the preliminary injunction
pending a determination of plaintiff's action for a permanent
injunction. 30 7 The Appellate Division, Second Department,
301. O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 521, 529 n.3, 523
N.E.2d 277, 281 n.3, 528 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 n.3 (1988).
302. 627 N.Y.S.2d 787 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1995).
303. See TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-71[D][2] (1978). This section
defines an "adult entertainment cabaret" as "[a] public or private establishment
which present[s] topless dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators or
exotic dancers or other similar entertainments and which establishment is
customarily not open to the public generally but excludes any minor by reason
of age." Id.
304. Pierce Arrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
305. See TOWN of HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-71[D][2] (1978). The
following excerpt sets forth the relevant provisions of the Code which define
the term "adult use":
(a) The appearance of any person on commercial premises for the
purposes of financial consideration in such a manner or attire
as to expose to view any portion of the pubic area, buttocks,
vulva, genitals or breast below the top of the areola, or any
simulation thereof.
(b) The appearance of any person on such premises in attire
generally considered to be garments worn underneath normal
streetwear for purient or commercial purposes.
Id.
306. PierceArrow Realty, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
307. Id.
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